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abstract: In debating the ethics of immigration, philosophers have focused much of 
their attention on determining whether a political community ought to have the discre-
tionary right to control immigration. They have not, however, given the same amount 
of consideration to determining whether there are any ethical limits on how a political 
community enforces its immigration policy. This article, therefore, offers a different 
approach to immigration justice. It presents a case against legitimate states having dis-
cretionary control over immigration by showing both how ethical limits on enforcement 
circumscribe the options legitimate states have in determining their immigration policy 
and how all immigrants (including undocumented immigrants) are entitled to certain 
protections against a state’s enforcement apparatus.
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In debating the ethics of immigration philosophers have tended to put 
aside questions of enforcement. In doing so philosophers have not done 
anything out of the ordinary. After all, philosophy typically brackets ques-
tions of enforcement, at least initially, when attempting to determine who 
is entitled to certain rights and who is bound by certain duties. The reason 
for this bracketing rests on the not-so-outlandish assumption that what a 
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right or duty ought to be is distinct from how that right or duty is to be 
exercised or guaranteed. In this regard, the ethics of immigration has not 
proved to be an exception: whether a political community ought to have the 
right to control immigration is taken to be a separate question from how a 
political community goes about enforcing this right.
In this article I raise a challenge to this conventional framing of the 
immigration debate. I argue that the issue of enforcement does matter in 
determining the presumptive rights or duties associated with immigration. 
In presenting my case, I begin in the first section by outlining a position 
put forth by Christopher Heath Wellman. I single out Wellman’s position 
because it puts forth one of the most intuitively appealing defenses of a 
state’s right to control immigration.
In the second section, I argue that Wellman’s position does not hold 
up, at least not from an egalitarian point of view, when concerns over 
border enforcement are taken into consideration.1 My claim is that when 
border enforcement is taken into consideration—which admittedly few 
 philosophers have done—a commitment to universal equality cannot be 
reconciled with a state having a presumptive right to control immigra-
tion. Instead, we find that a commitment to universal equality entails that 
a state’s right to control immigration be limited and that its admissions 
and exclusions criteria be determined largely by factors such as economic 
realities, family relationships, and sociohistorical circumstances. In short, 
when the  ethics of immigration is considered in its entirety—admission, 
exclusion, and enforcement—the only way to consistently reconcile a 
 people’s right to self-determination with a commitment to human rights 
is for the burden of proof (i.e., the presumptive duty) to be on the state and 
not the migrant.
Freedom of Association as the Freedom to Control Immigration
Recently, moral and political philosophers have taken an interest in the 
issue of immigration. As Seyla Benhabib, John Exdell, and Eduardo 
Mendieta have correctly pointed out, the reason for this emergent interest 
is that the ethical and political questions surrounding immigration expose 
a deep-seated tension between democratic autonomy (i.e., a people’s right 
to self-determination) and a commitment to human rights (i.e.,  liberal 
principles of individual freedom and universal equality).2 Within the 
JSP 29.1_07_Mendoza.indd   74 08/01/15   3:26 AM
reframing the philosophical debate over immigration 75
philosophical literature on immigration, this tension has given rise to two 
opposing  viewpoints. The first maintains that a commitment to demo-
cratic autonomy requires that a state have a presumptive—meaning an 
“all things equal”—right to control immigration.3 The other position gives 
greater weight to liberal principles of individual freedom and/or universal 
equality. This latter position maintains that a commitment to such prin-
ciples is incompatible with a state having a presumptive right to control 
immigration.4
In an attempt to breach this gap, Christopher Heath Wellman has 
recently proposed an innovative argument that appears to bring these two 
divergent positions together.5 Wellman argues that if a state is  legitimate—
by which he means a political community that respects human rights—then 
that state is entitled to self-determination and part of being self-determined 
includes having freedom of association. With respect to immigration, this 
means that a legitimate state has the presumptive right to control immi-
gration. Wellman’s position is therefore philosophically distinct in that it 
appears to have squared the immigration circle: it seems to have recon-
ciled a people’s right to self-determination with liberal commitments to 
 individual freedom and universal equality.
Wellman’s argument, by his own admission, is also wonderfully 
 simple. His argument is composed of three, rather innocuous, premises:
P1: legitimate states are entitled to political self-determination.
P2: an integral component of self-determination is freedom of 
 association.
P3: freedom of association includes the right not to associate.6
From these premises, Wellman derives the following conclusion: “Since 
freedom of association entitles one to refuse to associate with oth-
ers, legitimate political states may permissibly refuse to associate with 
any and all potential immigrants who would like to enter their political 
communities.”7
As we can see from premise 1, Wellman’s argument is carefully 
restricted to “legitimate” states. In other words, Wellman’s argument is 
not meant to extend to all possible states but only to those that meet his 
standard of legitimacy. According to Wellman, legitimate states are those, 
and only those, states that respect human rights (i.e., respect individual 
freedom and universal equality). His justification/explanation for this is 
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as follows: “There is a moral presumption against political states because 
they are by nature coercive institutions. This presumption can be defeated, 
however, because this coercion is necessary to perform the requisite politi-
cal functions of protecting basic moral rights. In my view, then, a regime is 
legitimate only if it adequately protects the human rights of its constituents 
and respects the rights of all others.”8
In an effort to generate intuitive support for premises 2 and 3, Wellman 
makes use of various analogies, the most persuasive being the analogy that 
likens immigration to marriage. According to this analogy, the autonomy 
of a legitimate state is a lot like the autonomy of an individual. An auton-
omous individual has the right to propose marriage to whomever he or 
she chooses (i.e., the right to associate with whomever one likes). This, 
 however, is not the extent of the right; freedom of association also entails 
the right to rebuff a marriage proposal (e.g., the right not to associate with 
whomever one does not like).
This analogy has a lot of intuitive appeal, since what could exemplify 
autonomy better than saying that we have a right marry whom we want 
and by the same token that we cannot force, or be forced by, others into 
marriage? If the autonomy of a legitimate state is sufficiently similar to the 
autonomy of an individual, at least in this one regard, then it seems almost 
obvious that a legitimate state ought to be entitled to freedom of associa-
tion.9 This analogy would therefore suggest that a legitimate state not only 
has the right to associate with whomever it wishes (e.g., has the right to 
admit whichever nonmembers it likes) but also has the right not to associ-
ate (e.g., the right to exclude nonmembers it does not like).10
The obvious problem that arises at this point in the argument is that, 
while Wellman gives lip service to respecting individual freedom and uni-
versal equality in premise 1, the rest of the argument seems ready to sacri-
fice these liberal principles for the sake of democratic autonomy. In order 
to complete his argument (i.e., show that his argument does indeed resolve 
the aforementioned tension between democratic autonomy and human 
rights), Wellman must demonstrate that his position, even if it does not nec-
essarily promote individual freedom and universal equality, does not run 
afoul of these liberal commitments. In other words, Wellman must show 
that his position can hold up against both egalitarian and libertarian chal-
lenges. To this end, he goes on to consider four possible  objections—two 
egalitarian and two libertarian—that could be raised against his  position. 
In this article, I focus only on his response to the egalitarian challenges 
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because my objection to Wellman—and to the framing of the immigration 
debate in general—is egalitarian in nature.
In considering egalitarian challenges to his position, Wellman is care-
ful not to conflate the distinction between moral and political equality.11 
Wellman therefore begins with the issue of moral equality and the possibil-
ity that immigration restrictions can undermine this liberal commitment. 
The first objection that Wellman considers focuses on the fact that people 
born in different countries have radically different life chances and that 
these different life chances are mainly the result of arbitrary luck. Because 
immigration controls can either perpetuate or ameliorate these arbitrary 
inequalities of birth, a commitment to moral equality would seem to entail 
that, as long as these arbitrary inequalities continue to radically affect 
 people’s life chances, restrictions on immigration are not justified.
With regard to this objection, Wellman concedes the crucial points: 
that all persons are due equal moral consideration and that there are indeed 
grave and unjustifiable global inequalities that both are arbitrarily assigned 
and radically affect people’s life chances. He, however, rejects the conten-
tion that this alone is sufficient to override a legitimate state’s freedom of 
association. This is because, for Wellman, there is an important difference 
between “luck egalitarianism” and “relational egalitarianism.” According 
to luck egalitarianism any unequal distribution of goods must have a 
rational explanation. So, from a luck egalitarian perspective, immigration 
restrictions are at odds with giving all persons equal moral consideration. 
For Wellman, however, this is too simplistic a view of moral equality. Luck 
egalitarianism, Wellman claims, is guilty of conflating moral equality with 
political equality and therefore glosses over the possibility that “the same 
inequalities which would clearly be pernicious among compatriots might 
well be benign when present between foreigners.”12 For example, it might 
be unjust to let some citizens vote in national elections while not letting oth-
ers, at least so long as there are no good reasons for this unequal treatment. 
It would not, however, be unjust to only let citizens vote in national elec-
tions while denying noncitizens the right to vote in those same elections.13
For this reason, Wellman argues that moral equality is best thought of 
in relational terms. In other words, moral equality is not simply a matter 
of having an equal distribution of goods but has other components to it as 
well. For example, in order for an inequality to be morally contemptible, 
both the inequality in question must be severe enough to warrant atten-
tion and there must also be a relation between the unequal parties, such 
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that one party is the cause of and/or unfairly benefits from this inequality. 
Wellman claims that under this view (i.e., the relational egalitarian posi-
tion) a commitment to moral equality would not necessarily “require us 
to guarantee that no one’s life prospects are affected by matters of luck.”14
To flesh out this point, Wellman compares two different cases of 
unequal opportunities to go to college. In the first case, a family pays for 
their son’s college tuition but refuses to pay for their daughter’s. In the 
second case, one family pays for their children’s college tuition, while 
another family does not pay for theirs. According to Wellman, both cases 
are examples of unequal distribution of goods and therefore would be con-
sidered morally unjust from a luck egalitarian perspective. By contrast, 
from a relational egalitarian perspective only the former would be consid-
ered morally unjust and not the latter. Wellman believes that while we per-
sonally might find both cases objectionable, only the first case constitutes 
a violation of moral equality, while our objections to the second case are 
based on “Samaritan” concerns. The point to take away from this is that, for 
Wellman, only inequalities of the relational variety count as infringements 
on moral equality, and therefore “even if achieving relational equality is 
important enough to trump other values like freedom of association, real-
izing luck equality is not important enough to deny people their rights to 
self-determination.”15
But even if luck egalitarianism is not sufficient to trump a legitimate 
state’s freedom of association, Wellman acknowledges that a concern for 
relational equality would be.16 In considering this possibility, Wellman con-
cedes that the world is indeed becoming more interrelated and distressingly 
unequal and furthermore that the wealth and prosperity of many countries 
can be directly linked to the poverty and misery of other countries.17 In this 
case, a commitment to moral equality does require that something be done 
to rectify these inequalities.
Yet even in these egregious cases Wellman denies that nonmembers 
have any moral claims to be admitted into or remain within a legitimate 
state. Wellman, following David Miller,18 argues that there are other ways 
for legitimate states to discharge their relational egalitarian obligations that 
do not require a legitimate state to admit or retain nonmembers that it does 
not wish to associate with. For example, a state could send some of its wealth 
to those less fortunate or intervene in certain parts of the world to make 
them safer or more hospitable.19 In other words, justice does not have to be 
done internally (e.g., accepting immigrants); it can also be “exported” out.
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These two counterarguments, the first addressing the luck  egalitarian 
objection and the second, the relational egalitarian objection, are for 
Wellman sufficient to show that his position is at least compatible with a 
commitment to moral equality. Yet there is still the possibility that granting 
a legitimate state the presumptive right to control immigration might lead 
to forms of discrimination that could threaten the political equality of citi-
zens. For example, denying admission to immigrants on grounds that they 
belong to a certain race, ethnicity, religion, and/or gender could have the 
effect of denigrating the status of citizens who happen to share that race, 
ethnicity, religion, and/or gender. In such cases, immigration restrictions 
could be responsible for undermining political equality.20
Wellman largely concedes this point and believes that there is 
 something inherently wrong with discriminatory immigration policies.21 
The problem he faces, however, is how to reject discriminatory immigra-
tion policies while consistently maintaining that legitimate states have a 
presumptive right to control immigration. This is especially problematic 
for Wellman because, as I explain below, he ultimately rejects a position 
such as that put forth by David Miller while at the same time being tempted 
by a position such as that of Michael Walzer.22
David Miller, who also defends a state’s presumptive right to control 
immigration, argues that a state can use various forms of criteria in setting 
its admissions policy. For example, a state could more readily admit immi-
grants who provide economic benefits or have values similar to those of its 
citizens. Yet Miller rejects the possibility that a state can use race or gender 
as a criterion for exclusion because “to be told that they belong to the wrong 
race, or sex . . . is insulting, given that these features do not connect to any-
thing of real significance to the society they want to join.”23
Wellman, however, is not persuaded by Miller’s argument. Returning 
to the marriage analogy, Wellman writes: “I would expect a black person 
to be insulted by a racist white who would never consider marrying some-
one who is black, but I would not say that this black person has a right not 
to be insulted in this way.”24 So while insults might be inappropriate, on 
Wellman’s account they are not sufficient to limit a legitimate state’s free-
dom of association. In other words, while it might be impolite, legitimate 
states are not bound by justice to not be insulting.
Wellman then considers an alternative to Miller’s position in the work 
of Michael Walzer. According to Walzer, as long as certain stipulations 
are met, a legitimate state can use criteria such as race to exclude certain 
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groups of people. The example Walzer uses is the “White Australia” policy, 
where he contends that there is nothing inherently unjust about a policy 
that admits only whites, so long as enough land is left for nonwhites to live 
on.25 Wellman is disturbed by Walzer’s position, but in returning to his 
own marriage analogy he notes that “as much as I abhor racism, I believe 
that racist individuals cannot permissibly be forced to marry someone out-
side of their race. . . . [Therefore] why does [freedom of association] not 
similarly entitle racist citizens to exclude immigrants based upon race?”26
Wellman ultimately rejects both Walzer’s and Miller’s positions on 
discriminatory immigration policy and opts instead for a view put forth by 
Michael Blake. Blake’s rejection of discriminatory immigration policies is 
as follows: “In all cases in which there are national or ethnic minorities . . . 
to restrict immigration for national or ethnic reasons is to make some 
citizens politically inferior to others.”27 This is a brilliant move. Blake’s 
rejection of discriminatory immigration policy is different from Miller’s 
because it rejects the policy not for the sake of nonmembers (i.e., it is not 
because the state owes something to would-be immigrants) but for the 
sake of doing justice to members who happen to share the race, ethnicity, 
religion, sex, gender, and so on being used as criteria for exclusion. The 
force of Blake’s argument, therefore, comes from its appeal to the political 
equality of citizens, which a legitimate state must accept. Even Walzer, the 
archcommunitarian, concedes as much when he writes: “No community 
can be half-metic, half-citizen and claim that its admissions policies are 
acts of self-determination or that its politics is democratic.”28 Therefore, 
a legitimate state, in order to maintain its legitimacy, must refrain from 
adopting discriminatory immigration policies.
Wellman happily adopts Blake’s position and concludes: “Whether or 
not we are sympathetic to the idea of a state designed especially to serve a 
specific racial, ethnic, or religious constituency, such a state is not exempt 
from the requirement to treat all its subjects as equal citizens.”29 In this way, 
Wellman believes that he has successfully defended a legitimate state’s pre-
sumptive right to control immigration against the possible objection that 
giving too much control to the state would undermine the political equality 
of citizens. This also brings to a close his larger response to the egalitarian 
challenge. Wellman, up to this point, has presented two egalitarian objec-
tions to his position, one concerning moral equality and the other, political 
equality, and he has provided responses to both that, at the same time, have 
not limited a legitimate state’s ability to control immigration.
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At this point in the argument, Wellman moves on to consider 
 libertarian challenges, but I will not consider his response to them. This 
is not because the arguments are not interesting but because my objection 
to Wellman is based on egalitarian concerns. Before I go into my view, 
however, I would like to acknowledge that there have already been various 
other objections raised against Wellman’s position. Some of these objec-
tions have focused on Wellman’s choice and selective use of analogies (e.g., 
immigration is like marriage and/or like a golf club).30 Others have argued 
that Wellman’s position overlooks nonideal harms, which in turn gener-
ate relational egalitarian duties to immigrants who have suffered (or will 
suffer) those harms.31 Still others have argued that Wellman’s position con-
flates a state’s right to control membership with a state’s right to control 
entry into (and/or have jurisdiction over) its territory.32 Last, some have 
pointed out that a legitimate state’s freedom of association is not a moral 
trump and can at times be overridden by other (and even similar) deontic 
concerns.33
My criticism of Wellman, however, is different from these and is 
intended to challenge the overall framing of the immigration debate within 
philosophy. My criticism looks at an area of the immigration debate that 
philosophers have largely ignored but that outside of philosophy is one 
of the most contentious aspects of the immigration debate: the enforce-
ment of the border. Wellman, in this regard, is not any more or less guilty 
than other philosophers. I focus on Wellman, however, for two reasons. 
First, as far as I can tell, his argument is the strongest anti-immigrant posi-
tion that can reconcile a people’s right to self-determination with a respect 
for human rights. Second, the egalitarian concerns I raise about border 
enforcement mirror the concerns he addresses, reviewed above. The differ-
ence, I hope to show, is that with regard to border enforcement a position 
such as Wellman’s cannot discharge its commitments to universal equal-
ity, at least not without at the same time limiting a legitimate state’s ability 
to control immigration.
Egalitarian Limits on Border Enforcement
Respect for the moral and political equality of persons can entail some fairly 
onerous duties. Regardless of whether one agrees with him or not, Wellman 
has taken those duties very seriously. In determining that a legitimate 
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state has the presumptive right to admit and exclude  immigrants, Wellman 
acknowledges that his position would have to meet some strenuous moral 
and political obligations and therefore proposes various ways for how to 
discharge those obligations without, at the same time, accruing any limita-
tions on a legitimate state’s right to control immigration. In this section, 
however, I wish to challenge this conclusion—that a legitimate state has 
the presumptive right to control immigration—by considering what, if 
any, limits there are to enforcing borders. By border enforcement, I have 
in mind the entire coercive mechanism that a state has at its disposal to 
prevent the unauthorized entry of civilian migrants. This includes, but is 
not limited to, things such as guards, physical barriers, weapons, sensors, 
surveillance technology, and the strategies through which these are all used 
in concert.
Taking into consideration the ethical implications of border enforce-
ment might at first seem odd. This is especially the case given that phi-
losophers, like Wellman, have focused only on questions of admission and 
exclusion: questions of who may be let in and who may be kept out. Border 
enforcement, on the other hand, has to do with questions of how and to 
what extent people may be kept out. These are obviously very  different 
questions, but an ethics of immigration needs to consider questions of 
enforcement for a number of reasons. First, people are not merely stopped, 
detained, delayed, or inconvenienced by border enforcement; people also 
die as a result of border enforcement. So regardless of how one sets one’s 
moral compass (e.g., deontology, virtue ethics, consequentialism, care 
 ethics, etc.), the human costs associated with border enforcement should 
not be taken lightly. Second, and related to the first, ethical limits on border 
enforcement provide an underappreciated rationale for why a state’s admis-
sions and exclusions criteria ought not to be discretionary but, instead, 
circumvented by factors such as economic realities, family relationships, 
and sociohistorical circumstances. The remainder of this section will be 
devoted to making this case.
In assessing the ethics of border enforcement, we must begin by 
assuming that a state’s use of border enforcement must adhere to the prin-
ciple of universal equality. If border enforcement does not adhere to this 
principle, then any state that deploys such enforcement cannot be said to 
be legitimate, or at least not legitimate under the definition supplied by 
Wellman. So, for example, even if it were morally permissible (or even 
politically necessary) to differentiate citizens from noncitizens at points of 
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entry, this allowance/necessity would not justify a state in using border 
enforcement that disproportionately targets people based on race, ethnic-
ity, sex, or gender. Discriminatory border enforcement, like discriminatory 
admissions policy, would still be prohibited because it would fail to treat all 
citizens as political equals.
An account like Wellman’s would find no trouble up to this point. Yes, 
certain limits must be placed on the type or amount of border enforce-
ment a legitimate state may deploy, but these limits would be in place 
to protect the rights of citizens and not because the state owes anything 
to  noncitizens. This would also not limit the discretion that a legitimate 
state has in determining admissions and exclusions criteria. In short, so 
long as the burdens associated with border enforcement (e.g., inspection 
and/or interrogation) do not affect citizens in an inegalitarian manner, 
there seems to be nothing unjust about immigration control remaining at 
the discretion of the state.
An account like Wellman’s, however, begins to run into difficulties 
when a state’s preferred admissions policy can only be enforced through 
the use of excessive means. This is problematic for two reasons. First, cer-
tain methods and practices of border enforcement, even if applied equally 
to all citizens, are nonetheless unjust because they would be too intrusive 
and therefore infringe on the basic liberties of individuals. For example, 
imagine that the only way to enforce a given immigration policy would 
be to detain everyone attempting to enter, including citizens, for a mini-
mum of ninety-six hours and to subject them to full body cavity searches. 
One does not necessarily have to be a libertarian to see why this type of 
border enforcement, even if it were applied equally to everyone, would be 
objectionable.
A second and more difficult challenge for an account like Wellman’s 
are cases where, even though the rights and equal standing of citizens are 
protected, border enforcement fails to give noncitizens equal moral con-
sideration. Imagine, for example, that a state can only enforce its preferred 
immigration policy by instituting a mechanism that vaporizes any and all 
unlawful border crossers. This example might seem a bit outlandish, but 
it should hopefully illustrate the following point: there are limits to the 
amount and/or type of border enforcement a state may deploy and still 
be considered legitimate (i.e., respectful of the moral worth of all persons, 
including nonmembers). To be clear, border enforcement does not need 
to be this extreme in order for it to be considered excessive, and on the flip 
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side it is also true that these two examples have not shown that all forms of 
border enforcement are excessive. There is likely a middle ground, but the 
fact that excessive border enforcement is possible (i.e., border enforcement 
that fails to live up to liberal principles) raises a difficulty for an account 
like Wellman’s. What should a state do when the only way to enforce its 
preferred immigration policy is through excessive border enforcement?
In such cases, a state seems to have four options. First, it could try 
to entice unwanted potential immigrants to either remain where they 
currently are or choose a different state to migrate to. This option would 
alleviate some of the pressure on border enforcement, thereby making it 
possible for a state to enforce its preferred immigration policy without the 
use of excessive force. Second, and maybe in conjunction with the first, a 
state could modify the internal “pull” factors that are attracting unwanted 
immigrants and again alleviate some of the pressure on border enforce-
ment. Third, a state can limit its border enforcement to morally accept-
able levels while at the same time tacitly accepting that there will be some 
degree of unauthorized entry into its territory. Last, a state can limit its 
border enforcement to morally acceptable levels while at the same time 
changing its immigration policy so that it better reflects the internal “pull” 
factors that are attracting immigrants.
Wellman has faced a similar dilemma before, so we have some idea as 
to which of these four options he would prefer. As noted earlier, Wellman 
proposes that a legitimate state could discharge its egalitarian duties by 
“exporting” justice (e.g., supply humanitarian aid, provide restitution, 
intervene in unjust societies, or pay other countries to take in needy immi-
grants). By exporting justice, Wellman believes, a state could be allowed 
to maintain discretion over its immigration policy while still meeting 
its egalitarian duties. But can a similar tactic work in the case of border 
enforcement? In the case of border enforcement, the closest thing to the 
“exporting” justice solution would be either option 1 or option 2.
On the surface, there seems to be nothing wrong with a state enticing 
unwanted potential immigrants to either remain where they currently are 
or choose a different state to migrate to. This could be done in a variety 
of creative and noncoercive ways. The problem, however, is that this will 
alleviate the pressure on enforcement only from those immigrants whose 
impetus to migrate is due to “push” factors, where immigrants are mainly 
trying to exit the state they are in and are not too concerned as to which 
state they eventually enter. Enticements to go to other states are much less 
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effective when migration is motivated by “pull” factors. These pull factors 
can include, but are not limited to, economic conditions where domestic 
labor will not or cannot adequately satisfy demand, where close family rela-
tions are present (e.g., young children trying to reunite with parents and 
vice versa), or where migration patterns have a long and established history 
(e.g., circular migration, colonialism, and military interventions). In these 
sorts of cases, enticements by themselves will not be enough to override the 
impetus that these migrants have to enter that particular state.
A state would therefore have to supplement option 1 with something 
like option 2: modify its internal factors that are attracting unwanted 
immigrants. This option, however, raises a host of serious problems. If 
these internal factors are primarily things such as the economy,  family 
 relationships, and history, it is unclear what a liberal (as opposed to a 
nationalist) state could do to significantly modify them. The economies 
of liberal states are increasingly becoming more and more globalized and 
are usually market-based as opposed to being nationalist and command-
based. This means that while government intervention is not inconsistent 
with a globalized market economy, liberal governments do not enjoy the 
same kind of control they would under a nationalized command-based 
economy. In short, the economic factors that create the need for immi-
grant labor (e.g., domestic labor’s inability, unattractiveness, or unwilling-
ness to satisfy  domestic demand) are largely outside the control of liberal 
governments.
The same can also be said for family and sociohistorical relationships. 
Once these relationships are established it is not easy (and at times might 
even be immoral) to sever them. For example, it would be folly to expect 
that a parent would allow a lack of immigration status to prevent him or 
her from being with his or her child. In this case, a state might opt to 
deport the citizen child (or any other family member), so as to remove the 
attraction that noncitizen family members have to the state, but deport-
ing citizens seems inconsistent with a commitment to political equality. 
There are also cases where circular migration, colonialism, and military 
involvement have had the effect of creating certain close relationships. In 
these sorts of cases a state can do some things to try and severe these rela-
tionships, but the inertia they carry will not easily or instantaneously be 
brought to a halt. For these reasons, options 1 and 2 do not provide a sat-
isfactory enough response to how a state can maintain both its legitimacy 
and its  presumptive right to control immigration.
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A third option would be to limit border enforcement to morally 
 acceptable levels and at the same time simply accept that there will be some 
degree of unauthorized entry. For an account like Wellman’s, this option has 
a built-in downside. While this option does not deny that a legitimate state 
may attempt to deter unlawful border crossings, it does limit what a legiti-
mate state can do to control immigration. It is true that these limits do not 
necessarily generate a positive right for noncitizens to immigrate (i.e., it is 
not an entitlement to be admitted), but they do generate a presumptive right 
in the negative sense: there are some things that a legitimate state cannot 
do to noncitizens, even when they are attempting to enter its territory with-
out permission. Furthermore, these limits would not be in place to ensure 
the rights of citizens but, rather, to protect the equal moral standing of 
 noncitizens. This option would therefore be a departure from Wellman’s ear-
lier position, where moral consideration for nonmembers does not necessar-
ily limit a legitimate state’s control over immigration. However, this option 
could still be made compatible with an account like Wellman’s because it 
still allows a legitimate state to maintain discretion over admissions policy.
The problem, however, is this option’s tacit acceptance of unauthorized 
entry. Besides the obvious hypocrisy this would involve, this option would 
enable conditions that lend themselves to exploitation and discrimination 
(i.e., violations of moral equality). Undocumented immigrants, because 
of their susceptibility to deportation, are one of the most vulnerable sub-
groups within any society. Their precarious situation leaves them virtually 
unprotected against various forms of exploitation and discrimination by 
both public (e.g., schools and police) and private (e.g., private employers 
and landlords) institutions. This kind of oppression and discrimination is 
a violation of moral equality because, even if undocumented immigrants 
do not have the political right to be present in a state, as persons they are 
entitled to have their basic human rights respected.34
Some might argue that the situation undocumented immigrants find 
themselves in is “of their own making” and so the state has no moral 
requirement to help ameliorate it. This view is wrong for two reasons. First, 
it is not clear that there is ever a case where those who put themselves in 
a bad situation do not deserve to have their basic human rights respected. 
Second, even if there are such cases, this does not seem to be one of them. 
In the situation we are considering, the state has tacitly allowed some 
degree of unlawful entry and to that degree is itself responsible for the pres-
ence of undocumented immigrants and the injustices that result. Option 3, 
therefore, does not seem to be a viable option either.
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The fourth and final option is for a state to limit its border enforcement 
to morally acceptable levels while also changing its immigration policy to 
better reflect internal “pull” factors. The upside of this option is that, if 
successfully implemented, it should reduce the demand for unlawful entry 
to a point where morally acceptable levels of border enforcement could be 
effective. By granting admission to those immigrants who are “pulled” 
into the state, most immigrants who are today undocumented would sud-
denly have lawful status. This would be a significant upgrade over option 3 
because this would prevent the state from being implicated in the creation 
of a subgroup susceptible to exploitation and discrimination. It would also 
be an improvement over options 1 and 2 because it would deal with pull 
factors (not just “push” factors) and would not be asking the government 
to intrude into the economy or in the lives of its citizens in liberally prob-
lematic ways. Therefore, this option seems to be, at least as far as liberal 
principles are concerned, the best and most consistent option available.
The only problem is that this option is irreconcilable with a position like 
Wellman’s. For starters it has the same downside that we saw with option 3: 
it limits the discretion that a legitimate state has with respect to border 
enforcement. Furthermore, this option also limits the discretion that a state 
has over its admissions and exclusions criteria. Under the fourth option, 
admissions and exclusions criteria must come to reflect internal “pull” 
factors, such as economic realities, family relationships, and even socio-
historical circumstances. These limitations are problematic for Wellman’s 
account because they show that, when border enforcement is factored in, 
legitimate states have presumptive duties that cannot be discharged with-
out at the same time having to associate with noncitizens whom it would 
rather not associate with. In other words, there is no way to “export” justice 
under this fourth option. Under this option, a legitimate state’s immigra-
tion policy is already overdetermined by internal factors, such as economic 
realities, family relationships, and sociohistorical circumstances, and is not 
properly discretionary.
Conclusion
If the argument from the preceding section is correct, it shows that when 
the question of border enforcement is taken into consideration, Wellman 
is left with the following dilemma: Either abandon his claim to liberalism, 
or concede that a legitimate state’s immigration policy should be bound 
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by presumptive duties owed to noncitizens. While I am not sure which of 
these two options Wellman would prefer (although I strongly suspect that 
he would reject both), I suggest that philosophers adopt something like 
the latter position. When debating the ethics of immigration, philosophers 
should take into account the moral and political implications of border 
enforcement because of its lethal potential and the way these implications 
alter the admissions/exclusions dynamic. In short, when border enforce-
ment is factored into an ethics of immigration philosophers will find that, 
in order to remain committed to universal equality, they must reject the 
notion that states (especially legitimate states) have a presumptive right to 
control immigration.
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